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Gentile v. State Bar: Core Speech and a Lawyer's
Pretrial Statements to the Press
If one stops to consider the collision which occasionally occurs
between the courts and the press, one discovers that it is a
contest, not between right and wrong, but between two
rights.. . . In such a tragedy the end is always disastrous. . . .1

The media has always been interested in the courtroom,
not only for its news but also for its entertainment value.2 This
interest has been fueled recently by sensationalized cases involving celebrities such as William Kemedy Smith and Mike
Tyson. A new cable channel, devoted entirely t o reporting
trials, has also increased public interest in this area. These
developments have brought new attention t o an old debate
about the propriety of a lawyer's statements to the press regarding pending litigation and the need for safeguards to mitigate the difficulty of finding a panel of objective jurors?
This debate reveals an important point of friction in the
principles the Supreme Court has developed for applying the
First Amendment to statutory restrictions and punishment of
speech. These principles, in rough outline, hold that the nearer
a person's speech is to political speech, the "core" of the Free
Speech Clause, the more compelling a state's reasons for regulating such speech must be for the regulations to pass First
Amendment s c r ~ t i n y . ~

1. Simon H. Rifkind, When the Press Collides With Justice, in SELECTED
ESSAYS ON CON~ITUTIONAL
L*AW 651, 651 (Edward L. Barrett, Jr. et al. eds.,
1963).
See id.
2.
A recent political cartoon is illustrative of this problem. The cartoon depicts
3.
William Kennedy Smith's prosecutor waving her arms and saying, "Now, we don't
want any hotshot Kennedy lawyers coming in here trying to prejudice a jury by
manipulating the press. Listen, did you read about those women we found, the
ones who say RAPE! WILLIE SMITH! RAPE! WILLIE SMITH!" Wright,
BEACHPOST, reprinted in NEWSWEEK,Aug. 5, 1991, a t 15.
4.
See infra part 1II.A; see also, GEOFFREYR. STONEET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW1024 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the different levels of First Amendment protec-
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One question that arises from this tenet is whether the
First Amendment standard should differ when states attempt
to regulate speech that impinges on another constitutionally
guaranteed right, such as the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
trial by an impartial jury. The Supreme Court recently had the
opportunity to address this very question as it relates to the
speech of attorneys.
In Gentile v. State ~ a r the
, ~Court considered the propriety of an attorney's press conference on behalf of a client who
had been indicted the day before. The case offered the Court an
opportunity to formulate a principle of law that would reconcile
some of the inherent difficulties between the First and Sixth
Amendments. Unfortunately, the Court's resolution of the issues presented in Gentile is not entirely satisfactory. But, the
opinion does recognize the rule that an attorney's speech may
be regulated more readily than that of the press.
This note examines the Gentile decision, paying particular
attention to three of the arguments set forth by Justice
Kennedy-two of which were rejected by a majority of the
Court--for limiting a state's right to regulate attorney speech.
Part I1 summarizes the underlying facts and procedural history
of the Gentile decision. Part I11 discusses the argument that
the speech in question was protected "political speech." The
discussion points out that this was Justice Kennedy's most
powerful theory and that it should have found favor with a
majority of the Court. Part IV addresses Justice Kennedy's
argument that the press conference was protected as a valid
attempt to counteract the publicity already surrounding the
case and finds this theory wanting. Part V discusses the "void
for vagueness" argument, which was accepted by a majority of
the Court. The examination of the Court's holding is designed
to help attorneys and legislatures understand what extrajuhcia1 speech is protected by the Constitution after this decision.
Finally, this note concludes that the general rule formulated by
Chief Justice Rehnquist-that an attorney's speech may be
regulated more readily than that of the press-is proper, but
that an exception should be made for attorneys engaged in core
political speech that does not harm the interests of the accused.

tion for "low value" and "high value" speech).
5.
111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
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11. A HISTORY OF THE Gentile DECISION
On January 31, 1987, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department discovered that approximately $300,000 in American Express Travelers checks and a substantial amount of
cocaine had been stolen from a safety deposit box a t the Western Vault Corporation in Las Vegas. The stolen goods were the
property of the police, who had used the goods a s part of a n
undercover operation. Initially, both police officers and employees of Western Vault were considered possible suspects. Eventually, however, the officers who had access to the lock box
were cleared of any charges, and the owner of the storage facility, Grady Sanders, was indicted for the crime.6
Sanders's attorney, Dominic Gentile, ostensibly hoping to
offset some of the adverse publicity his client had received,'
held a press conference the day d t e r the indictment. The crux
of Gentile's statement a t this conference was that the trial
would show that Sanders had been used as a scapegoat by the
police department, that one of the police officers with access to
the box was the actual party responsible for the break-in, and
that the prosecution's witnesses were not credible since some of
them were known drug dealers.' Six months later, Mr. Sanders was acquitted by a jury on all counts. After the acquittal,
the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board of the State Bar recommended a private reprimand of Mr. Gentile. The Board
found that, in holding the press conference, he had violated
Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177. The rule, which is patterned
from and nearly identical to the ABA's Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6: prohibits lawyers from making "an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be

6.
Brief of Petitioner at 2-7, Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (No.
89-1836).
7.
Gentile was apparently concerned with the effect of repeated press statements that the police officers with access to the box had passed polygraph examinations clearing them of the charges, whereas Mr. Sanders had refused to submit
to such a test. Polygraph results may not be submitted to the jury in Nevada. The
administrator of the polygraph examination was later arrested in a cocaine sting
and the veracity of his polygraph results were called into question. See Brief of
Petitioner a t 5, 7 n.6, Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (No. 89-1836).
8.
Mr. Gentile's prepared statement is set forth in APPENDIX A of Justice
Kennedy's opinion. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. a t 2736-37.
9.
MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCTRule 3.6 (1991). For a history
and general discussion of ABA Rule 3.6 and its predecessors, beginning in 1908,
r
see CHARLESW. WOLFRAM,
MODERNLEGALETHICS633-35 (1986).
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disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."1°
The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Mr. Gentile's First
Amendment challenge to the private reprimand and affirmed
the Board's action." The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed. The opinion of the Court was a combination of part of
Justice Kennedy's opinion,12 which favored reversal, and part
of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion,13 which advocated a f i r mation. Justice O'Connor's concurrence provided a fifth vote for
parts I11 and VI of Justice K e ~ e d y ' sopinion and parts I and I1
of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion.14 Thus, a majority of the
Court accepted Justice Kennedy's argument that the case
should be reversed because the statute, as interpreted,15 was
void for vagueness. No majority, however, was formed to accept
Justice Kennedy's other arguments in favor of reversal.

Perhaps the most significant result of the Gentile decision
is the rejection of Justice Kennedy's argument that the speech
i n question should have been protected as "political." By not
accepting this argument, a majority of the Court has essentially denied to lawyers (albeit in specifk situations) important
protections previously granted to the general public in some of
the Court's most significant First Amendment cases.
Because Gentile's press conference implicated "crooked
cops," Justice Kennedy argued that the speech was protected as

10.

NEV. SUP. CT. R. 177(1). The full text of Rule 177 is reprinted in APPEN-

DM B to Justice Kennedy's opinion. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2737-38.
11. Gentile v. State Bar, 787 P.2d 386 (Nev. 1990).
12.
Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
13.
Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, Scalia and Souter.
14.
Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice K e ~ e d ythat the Nevada rule was
void for vagueness and that the Nevada Supreme Court's decision should be
reversed. She also agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist that a state may regulate a
lawyer's speech more readily than that of the press and that the "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" test, contained in Rule 177, is constitutional
despite the fad that it is not as speech-protective as the "clear and present d m ger" test traditionally employed by the Court. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2748-49
(O'Connor, J. concurring).
15.
Justice Kennedy stressed that other similarly worded statutes are not
affected. The holding is limited to Nevada's particular interpretation of the statutory standard. Id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
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"p~litical."'~"At issue here is the constitutionality of a ban on
political speech critical of the government and its officials . . . .
[Tlhis case involves punishment of pure speech in the political
~oNM."''

A. Political Speech Is at the Core
of First Amendment Protection
I n First Amendment cases, a court must balance the interests served by the speech-limiting regulation against the interests of the First Amendment.18 In balancing such interests,
some forms of protected speech weigh heavier than others.
A well established principle of constitutional law recognizes that political speech constitutes the most highly protected
speech under the First Amendment. In Butterworth v.
Smith,lg for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a
Court that found a state statute disallowing grand jury witnesses from divulging their testimony, even after the grand
jury investigation was completed, violated the First Amendment. The statute's scope included testimony regarding improprieties by public officials, which was the focus of the constitutional challenge in that case. According to the Chief Justice,
"the publication of information relating to alleged governmental
misconduct [is] speech which has traditionally been recognized
as lying a t the core of the First A~nendment.'"~
Mr. Gentile's accusations against the police, who are government officials, certainly falls within the meaning of "inforand
mation relating t o alleged governmental miscond~ct'~~'
therefore should qualify as core speech. Society has definite
~
lawyers are
interests in exposing political c o r r u p t i ~ n ? and

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. "[Tlhe test requires a court to make its own inquiry into the imminence
and magnitude of the danger said to flow from the particular utterance and then
to balance the character of the evil, as well as its likelihood, against the need for
free and unfettered expression." Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 843 (1978); see also, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32
(1984).
19. 494 US. 624 (1990).
Id. at 632.
20.
Id.
21.
22.
See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 606 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("[C]ommentary on the fact that there is strong evidence
implicating a government official in criminal activity goes to the very core of
matters of public concern . . . .").
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often in a n opportune position to perform that function. Therefore, any limitations on a lawyer's speech in this regard should
be subject to First Amendment review.

B. The Clear and Present Danger Doctrine
In reviewing limitations on a lawyer's speech, the Court
should remember certain principles regarding the First
Amendment's relation to the judicial system that have already
been enunciated. Because of the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
~ ~ "clear and present
uninhibited, robust, and w i d e - ~ p e n , "the
danger"24 doctrine has traditionally governed First Amendment review. The doctrine was well explained i n the brief of
petitioner Times-Mirror Co. in Bridges v. Calif0rnia,2~a case
invalidating contempt convictions for editorial speech against
the judicial system, as follows:
The clear and present danger doctrine requires a weighing of
the evidence and a determination "whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about"
a substantial interference with the orderly administration of
justice.26

The Bridges decision, which struck down limitations on
free speech under the clear and present danger test, was reaffirmed in Pennekamp v. Florida2' and Wood v. Georgia:'
both of which struck down similar limitations on editorial
speech critical of the judiciary.
I n Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart:9 the Court found that
a "clear and present danger" had not been demonstrated and
invalidated a restraining order that prevented the press from
reporting on certain aspects of a pending multiple-murder case.
The Court stated that one of its tasks was to determine whether other measures, short of the restraining order, "would have
23.
New York Times .; Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
24.
The doctrine was first formulated by Justice Holmes in Schenk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
25.
314 U.S. 252 (1941).
26.
Id. at 255. Times-Mirror Co. was one of two successful petitioners in this
case.
27.
328 U.S. 331 (1946); see also, Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
28.
370 U.S. 375 (1962).
29.
427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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insured the defendant a fair trial."30Though assuring a fair
trial through means other than restraining speech may be
inconvenient, a limitation on free speech must be motivated by
something that "rises far above public inc~nvenience."~'
In addition to being in a n opportune position to recognize
political corruption, lawyers are able to provide valuable commentary on the workings of the public courts. As the Court said
in Landmark Communications, Inc. u. Virginia,32 a case that
struck down a Virginia statute making it illegal to report on
the proceedings of a commission that heard complaints about
judges: 'The operations of the courts . . . are matters of utmost
public concern."33 No less so are the operations of the police,
who bring criminal matters before the court. "The press does
not simply publish information about trials but guards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and critiism."^^ For these reasons the Supreme Court has consistently
upheld the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public criminal
trial.35
The importance of public knowledge of the workings of the
court system is one factor the Landmark Court considered
when it stated that the "Court has consistently rejected the
argument that [out-of-court] commentary constituted a clear
and present danger to the administration of justice."36 There
is "a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
~ ~ this "danger must
before utterances can be p ~ n i s h e d . "And,
not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil."38
The dangers of out-of-court commentary are greatest where
the out-of-court publicity relates to matters that will not be

30.
Id. at 563.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
31.
32.
435 U.S. 829 (1978).
Id. at 839.
33.
34.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (emphasis added).
35.
See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (holding that the closure of
a suppression hearing despite the objections of the accused, is valid only if: (1)
overriding interests are likely to be prejudiced by an open hearing; (2) closure is
no broader than necessary; and (3) the trial court considered reasonable alternatives); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (limiting a
state's right to close voir dire proceedings in a criminal trial).
Landmark, 435 U.S. at 844.
36.
37.
Brzdges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
38.
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).

816

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNNERSI'IY LAW REVIEW [I992

discussed in the courtroom. Thus, the Court in Sheppard u.
M a ~ w e l l which
, ~ ~ overturned Sam Sheppard's conviction for
the murder of his wife on the grounds that intensive and unrestrained press coverage had limited his chances of a fair trial,
found it especially compelling that "[mluch of the [prejudicial]
material printed or broadcast during the trial was never heard
from the witness stand."40Accordingly,
in Marshall v. United States . . . we set aside a federal conviction where the jurors were exposed "through news accounts"
to information that was not admitted a t trial. We held that
the prejudice fiom such material "may indeed be greater"
than when i t is part of the prosecution's evidence "for i t is
then not tempered by protective pro~edures.''~~

Unlike the material that was produced in the media and
never heard at the Sheppard trial, Mr. Gentile's remarks were
directed towards evidence that he did intend to bring forth at
trial. Thus, the dangers of out-of-court commentary in this case
were not as serious as those in Sheppard because the out-ofcourt comments were to be discussed and weighed more fully in
the courtroom.

C. Valid and Invalid Limits on a Lawyer's
First Amendment Rights
The cases cited thus far deal primarily with the speech
rights of the press42during litigation, and not with the rights
of an attorney. Indeed, "the two major opinions in Nebraska
Press Association both contain unsupported, conclusory language suggesting that the special protection afforded the press
might somehow be inapplicable to restraints against defendants and defense attorney^."^^ Chief Justice Rehnquist uses
39.
384 U.S. 333 (1966).
40.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 351.
41.
42.
Other cases have extended protection to citizens who publish statements
critical of the government. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (protecting a labor leader's publication of a letter critical of a judge).
43.
Monroe H. Freedman & Janet Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of
Expression by Defendants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum,
29 STAN. L. REV.607, 607 (1977). This article makes a strong argument for the
proposition that the Court's rationale in Nebraska Press Ass'n weighs equally in
favor of allowing defense attorneys the same free speech rights that the case upholds for the press, and that the Court's dictum to the effect that this is not the
case is unsupported.

8091

GENTILE V. STATE BAR

817

these statements to support his finding that the clear and present danger test and other principles enunciated therein do not
apply to attorneys, and that
lawyers are [not] protected by the First Amendment to the
same extent as those in other businesses . . . . [Tlhe speech of
lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for
regulation of the press in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart and
the cases which preceded it.44

That practicing attorneys give up some First Amendment
protection is undisputed. "Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with condition^.'"^ "The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential
to the primary governmental function of administering justice
and have historically been 'officers of the courts.' '"' As Justice
Stewart wrote in a concurring opinion in In re Sc~wyer:~"A
lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of
propriety and honor . . . . He who would follow that calling
must conform to those standards. Obedience t o ethical precepts
may require abstention from what in other circumstances
might be constitutionally protected speech.'"'

[Tlhe conflict [between the Court's obiter dicta and ratio decidendi] is a
superficial one, and the compelling analysis underlying Nebraska Press
Association will require a t least the same heavy presumption against
prior restraints on the first amendment rights of defendants and their
attorneys as has been recognized with respect to orders limiting press
reports of pending litigation.
Id. at 619.
44.
Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2744 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., opinion
of the Court) (citation omitted). Justice K e ~ e d y ,on the other hand, argues that
the Nevada test "approximated" the "clear and present danger" test and should be
, plurality opinion). I n re Sazuyer,
interpreted accordingly. Id. at 2725 ( K e ~ e d y J.,
a case overturning the temporary suspension of a n attorney for speech regarding
litigation, presented facts similar to the Gentile case. However, the Court decided
not to reach the constitutional issue, stating that "since it is clear . . . that the
finding upon which the suspension rests is not supportable by the evidence adduced, we have no occasion to consider the applicability of Bridges, Pennekamp, or
Craig. We do not reach or intimate any conclusion on the constitutional issues
presented." In re Sawyer, 360 US. 622, 626-27 (1959) (citations omitted).
45.
Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) (quoting In re Rouss, 116
N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917)).
46.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). But cf. Cammer v.
United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956) (holding that attorneys are not "officers of
the court" in the same way as are publicly paid court employees).
47.
360 U.S. 622 (1959).
48.
Id. at 646-47.

8 18

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992

Gentile's speech, however, was not just speech that "might
be constitutionally protected."49 Rather, it was speech that
dealt with alleged improprieties on the part of public officials,
and should be protected as "core" First Amendment speech. The
underlying principles and rationale of the cases enunciating the
"clear and present danger" test are strong and important
enough t o apply even to lawyers when they are engaged in
such core political speech.50This argument is especially compelling in light of more recent cases invalidating professional
rules regulating even the non-core, commercial speech of attorney~.~~
Perhaps the strongest argument against reversing the
Nevada court's decision on "political speech" grounds, however,
is that it would force the Supreme Court to prioritize between
First and Sixth Amendment rights. The Court made it clear in
Nebraska Press Ass'n that it was unwilling to do thisS2According to the facts in Gentile, such a prioritization might not
be necessary. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by an
"impartial jury" was designed primarily to protect the accused,
not the state, or even the judicial system.53Indeed, ABA Mod49.
Id. (emphasis added).
supra note 9, at 632 11.88 ("AU of the opinions in In re
50.
See, e.g., WOLFRAM,
S a y e r , for example, seem to concur that speech by a lawyer abstractly attacking
rules of law or the administration of justice could not constitutionally be used to
discipline a lawyer.") (citation omitted). Special rules for prosecutors, or for lawyers
in general, that do not apply to others may raise questions of "viewpoint discrimination which is 'censorship in its purest form' and is 'subjected to the highest
levels of scrutiny.' " Scott M. Matheson, The Prosecutor, the Press and Free Speech,
L. REV.865, 904-905 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
58 FORDHAM
51.
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (advertising for legal clinic, so long
as it is not deceptive, is entitled to First Amendment protection from state regulation); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (state ethics rule prohibiting lawyer from soliciting by sending letters to potential clients held unconstitutional). In both of these cases, First Amendment interests prevailed over arguments
that the maintenance of professionalism or the reputation of the legal system
required protection from certain types of lawyer speech. This standard prevails in
other professions as well. E.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (invalidating limitation on speech by pharmacist, despite rationale concerning the reputation of the profession). However, as
Chief Justice Rehnquist points out, even in these cases a balancing test was
employed. Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2744 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
opinion of the Court).
52.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976). Chief Justice
Rehnquist came close to rejecting this principle, however, when he declared that,
"[flew, if any, interests under the Constitution are more fundamental than the
right to a fair trial by 'impartial' jurors." Gentile, 111 S. Ct. a t 2745 (emphasis
added).
53.
Although an impartial jury works both to the benefit of the accused and
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el Rule 3.6 also seems to have been drafted primarily with the
rights of the accused in mind.54The accused in this case, however, was, if anything, benefitted by his attorney's behavior.
This does not matter as far as Rule 177 is concerned, but it
does suggest a way for the Court to reject the statute itself on
constitutional grounds and avoid having to hold that the right
to free speech is more or less important than the right t o a fair
trial.
A principle could be formulated whereby an attorney's
statements to the press would fall outside the condemnation of
the rule if they did not prejudice the potential venire against
the accused and if the speech in question was "directed a t public officials and their conduct in offi~e."~Mr. Gentile argued
that the clear and present danger standard that applies t o the

the state, the Sixth Amendment says, "the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ." U.S. CONST.,amend. VI (emphasis added). The superior importance of the rights of the accused is illustrated
by the procedure allowing a n accused to appeal a conviction on due process
grounds, whereas the state may not appeal an acquittal on similar grounds. For
example, in Sheppard v. Maxwell the Court held that "[dlue process requires that
the accused receive a trial by a n impartial jury free from outside influences. Given
the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difFiculty of effacing prejudi-,
cia1 publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is. never weighed against the accused." Sheppard
v. Maxwell 384 U.S. a t 333, 362 (1966) (emphasis added). See also Freedman &
Starwood, supra note 43, at 618 ("The Sixth Amendment guarantees a fair trial to
the defendant, not to the state, and the defendant's exercise of First Amendment
rights poses no threat to that guarantee.").
54.
The clearest instance of potential for such interference [with judicial
proceedings] is prosecutorial comment on a pending case, and occasional decisions can be found in which a court has applied [the predecessor
to Rule 3.61 to a prosecuting lawyer for such public comment . . . .
Moreover, because of the f a d that prosecutor statements are typically
much more likely to influence prospective jurors, Rule 3.6 . . . can be
violated more readily by prosecutors in criminal cases than by defense
lawyers or by lawyers in any other setting.
WOLFRAM,supra note 9, a t 634-35; see also Matheson, supra note 50 a t 868-69
("[Ilt is the prosecutor's extrajudicial publicizing, not defense counsel's, that might
imperil the defendant's fair trial right.").
55.
Gentile, 111 S. Ct. a t 2724 ( K e ~ e d y ,J., plurality opinion). Other commentators have argued that defense attorneys in general should be afforded immunity from extrajudicial speech limitations. See, e.g., Freedman & Starwood, supra
note 43. The rule proposed herein would have much the same effect but would
limit the scope of such arguments to speech not only made on behalf of the accused but that also furthers "core" or political expression. For an opinion more
akin to this argument see Richard B. Hirst, Comment, Silence Orders: Preserving
Political Expression by Defendants and their Lazuyers, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
595 (1971) (arguing that defense attorneys should not be subject to silence orders
in cases involving indictments that are politically motivated).
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press should also apply to him in this case.56Gentile's proposal, though, only makes it more difficult for lawyers to be disciplined. It does not consider whether the speech in question is
"core speech" or is furthering society's interest in exposing
political corruption. The rule formulated above, however, has
a n advantage over the clear and present danger standard in
dealing with lawyers. It advances society's strong interest in
exposing political corruption while protecting the accused from
negative pretrial publicity.
This rule would be a valid exception to the general rule
allowing regulation of attorney speech on pending litigation.
The Court has recognized such "political speech" exceptions to
restrictions on lawyer speech before. For example, although the
Court upheld a regulation on direct solicitation of clients in
~ ? Court also carved out
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar A ~ s h , the
a n exception to this rule for solicitations that furthered "political" causes in In re P r i r n ~ s . ~ ~
The P r i n u s case,involved solicitation by an ACLU attorney
of a possible client in an anti-sterilization case. According to
the Court, "This was not in-person solicitation for pecuniary
gain. Appellant was communicating a n offer of free assistance . . . . And her actions were undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to advance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial gain."59 If a
"political speech" exception can be carved from a general rule
upholding state anti-solicitation regulations, so too, can such a n
exception be carved from a general rule upholding state regulations against a n attorney's comments on pending litigation.

In part I1 of his opinion, Justice Kennedy details the great
amount of adverse publicity Mr. Sanders received prior to his
indictment, together with the favorable publicity received by
56.
Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2742 (&hnquist, C.J., opinion of the Court); but see
supra text accompanying note 44.
57.
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
58.
436 U.S. 412 (1978).
Id. at 422 (emphasis added); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
59.
(1963). In Button, the Court held that the NAACPs attempts to advance civil
rights goals by explaining those goals to potential clients may not be penalized
under state anti-solicitation rules. Id. This case was relied on in In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412 (1978).

GENTILE V. STATE BAR
the police.60Justice Kennedy noted that, "[flar from an admission that he sought to 'materially prejudic[e] an adjudicative
proceeding,' petitioner sought only to stop a wave of publicity
he perceived as prejudicing potential jurors against his client
and injuring his client's reputation in the comm~nity."~'

A. A Lawyer's Role in-Highly Publicized Cases
Justice Kennedy's arguments paint an admirable picture of
a lawyer battling against the unfair forces lined in opposition
t o his client. "An attorney's duties do not begin inside the
courtroom door."62Perhaps especially compelling is the argument that Mr. Gentile's client had suffered great personal and
economic harm as a result of the adverse publicity before the
case, and that the press conference in his favor helped to alleviate this. The strength of this argument, however, is weakened
by the self-contradictory nature of the statement that a lawyer
is in fact not trying t o prejudice a proceeding, but is merely
trying to counter already existing prejudice. The battle is t o be
fought in the courtroom, and the fact that one side has broken
this rule by engaging in out-of-court commentary doesn't give
the other side clearance to do the same. "Legal trials are not
like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall,
~
theory of our system is
the radio, and the n e ~ s p a p e r ? "The
that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced
only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any
outside influence, whether of private talk or public ~ r i n t . ' ~
A committee of the New York Bar that met to formulate a
statute similar t o Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, discussed
the issue of whether an attorney, when faced with publicity
adverse to his client, should be able to use the press to fight
back, and concluded as follows:
At first blush, it may seem reasonable enough to permit
a lawyer to fight fire with fire, but a moment's reflection

60.
Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2727-28 ( K e ~ e d y ,J., plurality opinion). Such treatment is apparently routine in criminal cases because reporters tend to rely on law
enforcement for their sources. See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 50, at 890 n.143 ("It
is well established that reporters get most of their crime news from law enforcement sources.").
61.
Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2728 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
Id.
62.
63.
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941).
64.
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
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will make it apparent that even the-publication of an indictment may be thought to justify defense counsel in
publishing his version of the merits, what defense witnesses will testify, and so on. Once the interchange of
publicity has begun, there is no way to stop it or in
many if not most cases even to tell when or how it began.65

Rather than fighting back in the press, the attorney's primary responsibility is to assure that a fair trial is had despite
any prior adverse publicity. Various means are at the disposal
of the lawyer and the court to accomplish this, including voir
dire, change of venue, instructing the jury to disregard press
reports about the trial, and even after-trial appeals based on a
tainted jury.

B. The Difficulty of Ignoring an Adversary's Press Statements
On the other hand, voir dire, change of venue, and other
such methods do not always assure that the accused will receive a fair trial. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
Even if a fair trial can ultimately be ensured through voir
dire, change of venue, or some other device, these measures
entail serious costs to the system. Extensive voir dire may not
be able to filter out all of the effects of pretrial publicity, and
with increasingly widespread media coverage of criminal
trials, a change of venue may not suffice to undo the effects of
[pre-trial] statements . . . .66

Furthermore, in cases like Gentile, prosecutors can make
highly prejudicial statements to the press, and be protected
under subdivision 3(b) of the Nevada rule,6' so long as their
statements came from the defendant's indictment-a public
record. As Justice K e ~ e d ypointed out, considerations other
than the fairness of the trial also need to be examined. In upholding a restraint on pretrial publicity, for example, the Fed65.
SPECIAL
COMM.
ON RADIO,
TELEVISION,
AND THE ADMIN.
OF JUSTICE,
ASSOCIOF THE PRESS AND FAIR
ATION OF THE BAR OF THE ClTY OF NEW YORK,FREEDOM
TRIAL:FINALREPOWWITH RECOMMENDATIONS
18 (i967).
66.
Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2745 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., opinion
of the Court). Although the Chief Justice does not acknowledge it, this argument,
which he makes against Gentile's position, cuts both ways.
67.
"Notwithstanding subsection 1 and 2(a-f), a lawyer involved in the investigation or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration: . . . [tlhe information
contained in a public record . . . NEV.SUP. CT. R. 177(3)(b).

."
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eral District Court for the Southern District of New York, in
pointed to the plight of a defendant
United States u. Sirn~n,~'
in a highly publicized case, who, after his acquittal, wanted to
know "where he might go to have his reputation restored t o
him?' The court elaborated:
In the aftermath of a celebrated trial, members of the public
may come to believe that certain defendants were acquitted
not because of their innocence, but rather, because of a
prosecutor's incompetence or tactical error, the fame or oratorical skill of defense counsel, or even because of vaguely
understood concepts of the 'legal technicality' through which
an otherwise guilty individual escapes the grasp of justi~e.'~

Despite their shortcomings and costs, however, voir dire,
change of venue and other such methods are the means that
have been created to deal with negative pretrial publicity. The
efficacy of these tools is uncertain. But equally uncertain is the
effectiveness of an attorney's statements to the press as a tool
for offsetting previous statements by the other side. Consequently, Justice Kennedy's argument that Gentile's statement
should be protected because it countered prejudice was rightfully rejected by a majority of the Court.

V. VOIDFOR VAGUENESS
A. The Argument
That the statute in question is vague on its face is a difficult argument to overcome. Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177(2)
lists several types of statements that are likely to be prohibited
under the rule. These include statements relating to, "[tlhe
character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a part y . . . or witness," as well as "[alny opinion as to the guilt or
innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case."71Rule
177(3) then lists statements a lawyer may make "without elaboration"; these include "[tlhe general nature of. . . the def e n ~ e . "Gentile
~~
found, as would any defense attorney whose
strategy revolved around the credibility of witnesses and the
innocence of his own client, that the prohibitions of Rule 177(2)
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

664 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
Id. at 789 11.13.
Id.
NEV.SUP. CT. R. 177(2).
NEV.SUP. CT. R. 177(3).
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were difficult to reconcile with Rule 177(3)'s authorization of a
statement on the general nature of the defense.
A majority of the Court held that the rule was void for
vagueness because a reasonable attorney had no way of knowing whether a statement would be protected under the Rule
177(3) safe harbor, for statements regarding the "general nature" of the defense, or whether it would be construed as a n
"elaboration," forbidden under Rule 177(1). Thus, the rule met
the traditional test for vagueness because people "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its appli~ation."~~
B. Can an Attorney Speak to the Press "Safe1y"After Gentile?
The Court's void-for-vagueness ruling is a step in the right
direction and will probably curtail some overly vigorous enforcement of ABA Model Rule 3.6, as enacted by the various
states.?* Whether Gentile offers any real guidance to attorneys
who wish t o hold a press conference or speak to reporters without violating the rule is unclear. Any guidelines the case offers
are ambiguous a t best.
Nevertheless, some points are worth noting. For example,
Mr. Gentile's testimony that he thought his statements were
protected under Rule 177(3) seemed to weigh very favorably
with the Court. Passages from Mr. Gentile's conference are
given to show his "attempt to obey the rule."75 When asked if
he could elaborate on some of the statements, Mr. Gentile replied, "I can't because ethics prohibit me from doing so. Last
night before I decided I was going to make a statement, I took
a close look at the rules of professional responsibility. There
are things that I can say and there are things that I can't.
0k a ~ ? " ~ '

73.
C o ~ a l l yv. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
74.
According to WOLFTUM,supra note 9, at 635, many decisions have upheld
R E S P O N S I B DR
I~
Rule 3.6's predecessor statute, MODELCODE OF PROFESSIONAL
7-107, against free-speech, vagueness and overbreadth attacks. One case went so
far as to refbe admission pro hac vice to a lawyer previously in violation of the
rule. State v. Ross, 304 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio 1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 904
(1974). Another condemned a lawyer for encouraging a juror to talk to the media
about a completed case. State v. Young, 438 A.2d 344 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1381).
75.
, ., opinion of
Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2731 (1991) ( K e ~ e d y J
the Court).
76.
Id.
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Thus, even though Gentile's opening statement may have
violated some of the taboos set forth in rule 177(2), the fact
that he refused to answer some of the questions on grounds
that his reading of the rule precluded him from doing so allowed the Court t o hold that he had made a good faith effort to
stay within the safe harbor. The Court stated, "The fact Gentile
was found in violation of the Rules after studying them and
making a conscious effort at compliance demonstrates that
Rule 177 creates a trap for the wary as well as the un~ary."~'
A lawyer wishing to hold a press conference under Nevada
Rule 177, or a similar rule, would thus be wise to let it be
known at the press conference that he has studied the ethical
rule in question and is making a good faith effort t o follow its
precept^.'^ In states like Nevada, which have no common law
or further interpretations of the rule, such actions may assure
a t least some defense to any charges of violations of the rule on
void-for-vagueness grounds. This suggests the need for the
states, either legislatively or in the courts, to formulate clearer
guidelines. Nevertheless, the best rule for attorneys is to proceed with caution.79
VI. CONCLUSION
The rule formulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Gentile
that allows a state t o "regulate speech by lawyers representing
clients . . more readily than it may regulate the press,"80 and
thus to ignore the rigid "clear and present danger" test in its
restrictions on attorney speech is supported by important policies. It is a principle that should not be cast aside simply to
allow lawyers to fight pretrial fire with fire. However, "[tlhis
does not mean . . . that lawyers forfeit their First Amendment
rights . . . ."81 When core political speech is involved, a narrow

.

77.
Id. at 2732.
78.
United States v. Bingham, 769 F. Supp. 1039, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1991), one of
the f r s t attorney disciplinary actions to cite Gentile in dealing with a lawyer's
statements to the press, shows that if an attorney offers no excuse for "knowingly"
and "willfully" violating a similar rule, courts will not hesitate to impose a penalty.
The Binghum decision also discussed with approval Justice Kennedy's opinion that
the timing of the attorney's statements are an important consideration. Id. at 104445. Statements made close to the eve of trial seem more likely to be reprimanded.
79.
This is especially true now that Justice Marshall, who sided with Justice
Kennedy, has left the Court.
80.
Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2748 ( O ' C o ~ o r ,J. concurring).
Id.
81.
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exception should be carved from Chief Justice Rehnquist's general rule that would allow attorneys to engage in such speech
so long as the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused are not
damaged by this speech. Such a rule would allow the press a
head start in pursuing claims of political corruption, while at
the same time protecting the right of the accused to be tried by
a jury that is not poisoned against him.

D. Christopher AZbright

